On at least one issue, I fear I am a traitor to the liberal/Democrat’s cause: The immediate withdrawal of American troops from Iraq.

I opposed the war in the very beginning, and wanted troops pulled out for the longest time.

But after much thought and reflection, I’ve decided that I can’t support the Democrats’ recent calls for an immediate pull-out.

Succinctly, here are my two reasons:

1. The new commander of forces in Iraq, Gen. Petraeus, has implemented the strategy that has been previously lacking in the conduct of this war: counterinsurgency. We must give him the time and resources to prove whether or not implementing COIN now can work. He has stated that he will be upfront with the American people and Congress if he doesn’t believe the job can be done.
2. Prior to the war, Iraq was not a terrorist haven. That’s established. But now it is. It’s our own fault. We created this hell-hole that, if we leave now, will become a full-fledged terrorist dream-state. Going into Afghanistan was justified because it harbored the terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11. Staying in Iraq now is justified because it will become the state harboring terrorists (willingly or not) if we leave before defeating them.

I don’t expect many people to agree with me, but I will keep trying to convince them that Gen. Petraeus deserves a chance. Further, we have to consider the future before we make calls for a quick, unilateral withdrawal (which sounds much like what we forgot to do on the way to the war in the first place).

The Weekly Standard has some information on the current progress (which, again, I won’t completely believe is progress until more time has passed and a more noticeable amount of progress has been made; my support for continued involvement in the conflict is not infinite):

In the past, U.S. troops would follow up a successful offensive by retreating to their remote, heavily fortified Forwarding Operating Base, and insurgents would slink back into the area just liberated at a heavy price in blood. To avoid that happening this time, Colonel Charlton and his battalion commanders have moved many of their men off the main base, Camp Ramadi, and sent them to live in the city. U.S. troops have established four bases in Ramadi itself along with more than 40 Joint Security Stations and Observation Posts where they work alongside Iraqi soldiers and police. There are also 23 police stations in the city and surrounding area. Those mini-forts are located within eyeball range of one another, as I saw for myself when I went to a rooftop Observation Post at one Joint Security Station and was able to discern close by another Coalition outpost. Surveillance capacity is increased with the deployment of computer-controlled cameras on 100-foot poles. U.S. and Iraqi forces have spun such a tight web in town that insurgents are having a hard time crawling back in.

. . .

The big question now is whether Coalition forces can have similar success in the country’s epicenter. As part of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (”Enforcing the Law”), they are now applying the same “clear, hold, and build” strategy in Baghdad that worked so well in Ramadi and, before, in Tal Afar and Qaim. But the situation in the capital is considerably more complex, because the fight is not just between Sunni moderates and Sunni extremists but also between Shiite moderates and extremists as well as between Shiites and Sunnis of all stripes. And, of course, the capital is much bigger. All of Anbar has 1.25 million residents. Baghdad has some 6 million. Each of its security districts has more people than Ramadi. Even when the “surge” is completed in June, U.S. and Iraqi troops will not have as heavy a presence on a per capita basis in Baghdad as they have now in Ramadi.

. . .

More U.S. soldiers now live in the neighborhoods they patrol, in Joint Security Stations such as the one that I visited in Hurriya in western Baghdad. Here soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division sleep and work alongside men from the Iraqi army and National Police. They lack the normal comforts of life on a big base: Instead of getting to choose from multiple flavors of ice cream at a large DFAC (Dining Facility), they have to be content with one hot meal a day. The rest of the time they make do with field rations–MREs (Meals Ready to Eat). But what such outposts lack in amenities they make up for in effectiveness. As they have established their presence, soldiers have found the number of tips from residents appreciably increasing. This makes U.S. soldiers safer. They are no longer simply speeding down streets in their armored Humvees hoping not to hit an IED. They are now conducting targeted raids and foot patrols, the basis of any effective counterinsurgency.

. . .

Their work is part of a delicate campaign on the part of Coalition forces designed to kill or capture “irreconcilable” insurgents while winning over the “reconcilable.” The man directing both sides of this effort, political and military, is General David Petraeus, who in February assumed command of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, making him the senior U.S. commander in the country. Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, a bald-headed bull of a man, heads Multi-National Corps Iraq, with direct operational responsibility for Coalition forces. Petraeus’s job is to focus on the big picture–to try to translate some of the success Coalition troops have been having at the tactical level into strategic success.

It is hard to imagine anyone better qualified for this exceedingly difficult assignment–what Petraeus calls “the postgraduate level of warfare.” The 54-year-old four-star has already spent more than two and a half years in Iraq, first as commander of the 101st Airborne Division, then as head of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, with responsibility for training Iraqi Security Forces. Following these stints, he oversaw the production of Field Manual 3-24, the bible of counterinsurgency warfare for the U.S. armed forces.

Petraeus is that rare combination, a man of intellect who is also a man of action. He looks slight and bookish and has a Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton (he wrote his dissertation on how the Vietnam war affected military thinking). But he is also a physical fitness fanatic who is famous for challenging and beating soldiers half his age at push-up contests. His toughness is legendary–he bounced back from a training accident in 1991 when he took an M-16 round right in the chest (his life was saved by surgeon and future senator Bill Frist) and from a sky-diving accident nine years later in which he broke his pelvis.

. . .

The stakes couldn’t be higher. U.S. commanders report that, whatever the case before the war, Iraq has now become the central front of al Qaeda operations, drawing jihadists from all over the world. It is also a central front in Iran’s offensive to become the dominant player in the region. American generals say they have been “shocked” to discover the level of Iranian influence in Iraq. The Iranians are supporting not only the Mahdi Army, Badr Brigades, and other Shiite militias, but also, the generals believe, al Qaeda–the very group killing Shiites en masse.

Petraeus feels that he is making slow, steady progress against the myriad enemies that Coalition forces confront, but he is keenly aware that results may not come fast enough to please antiwar politicians back home who are eager to pull all U.S. troops out of Iraq, and damn the consequences. “The Washington clock is ticking faster than the Baghdad clock,” Petraeus often says. His goal is to speed up the Baghdad clock by pressing for more reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites, and to slow down the Washington clock by showing gains on the ground that can reverse public pressure to pull U.S. troops out prematurely.

. . .

Obviously, things are in no way perfect in Iraq — nor are they a “cakewalk” or improving at a pace any of us would like to see. But with the right strategy, the right commander, the dedication of our troops and a little continued support, we might just be able to calm this thing down enough that we won’t have to go back in to clean it up — like Afghanistan — after the next terrorist attack (on American soil or elsewhere). [Note: I’m not trying to use the “mushroom cloud” or “fight them there or fight them here” arguments.]